Becker
and Shane’s article revolves around President Obama balancing the drone and targeted
killing program with his liberal principles and explores if the program has
been effective. Through the use of armed
unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), precision airstrikes, and targeted killings,
policy makers in national security have made the United States safer and more
secure. The program has decimated the
ranks of Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist organizations, refocused the efforts
of the War on Terror specific groups as opposed to large scale conflicts and
nation building (Iraq War), been cost effective in terms of both American lives
lost and monetary costs, and forced terrorist groups and militants to spend
more time evading attacks instead of planning attacks on Americans and American
interests.
While it is difficult to find the
total monetary cost of the targeted killing campaign, figures are available for
the cost of the drones. The MQ-9 which is
commonly used in lethal strikes costs $12 million, a fraction of the cost of
the new F-35, and even after accounting for crashed drones and the large crew
of support personnel for them, the American security project finds that they
are cheaper to operate than manned jet aircraft. Additionally, while we don’t have figures for
total cost of the campaign, we can be sure that it is nowhere near the costs of
the Iraq or Afghan war which involved costly invasions, occupations, and
rebuilding (costs estimated at $4-6 trillion).
The use of drones and precision
airstrikes has allowed policy makers to target threats in areas that are inaccessible
to ground forces (for reasons of terrain or cost in loss of lives). According to the New America Foundation’s database, cited in Carpenter and Lina’s
article, 1755-2950 militants have been killed to date in Pakistan and 708-945
in Yemen. The majority of those killed
in Pakistan belonged to the Taliban, Haqqqani network (a group closely tied to
the Taliban and has been behind numerous deadly attacks on NATO forces), or Al
Qaeda and the strikes in Yemen have been almost entirely on Al Qaeda or its
regional affiliates. Aside from diminishing
their operational abilities, the body count also can have a psychological
effect on the enemy, knowing that so many of their comrades have been killed
and that any of them could be next at any time, regardless of how high up they
are in the organization. Knowing that
there is a high likelihood of being killed can be a deterring factor for
borderline extremists thinking about joining one of the movements. Among those killed have been senior leaders
of the militant and jihadist groups which have resulted in new inexperienced
commanders taking their place and less organizational cohesion.
There have been 393 drone strikes in
Pakistan to date and 117 in Yemen. The constant
pace of the strikes has kept the enemy on the run and forced them to devote the
majority of their time to attempting to evade surveillance or death. It naturally follows that if their priorities
shift to just attempting to survive, they will have less time and resources to
plan attacks or recruit new members. There has been no terrorist attack approaching
9/11 in size since the war on terror has begun and the targeted killing program
has played a vital role in that. Safe havens
from which attacks could be planned have been eliminated; leaders, bomb makers,
logistical planners, and propagandists have killed. All of this has resulted in a diminished
ability on behalf of terrorist organizations to launch an attack on American
soil or American interests.
Becker
and Shane state that the targeted killing program has allowed president Obama
to refocus the War on Terror on Al Qaeda and core terrorist threats. By focusing on the targeted killings and
withdrawing from large scale occupations and conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan,
the death toll for both American troops and Muslim civilians has been brought
down. This has allowed the U.S. and President Obama
to promote the idea that the U.S. is not at war with Islam but at war with extremist
terrorist groups. Becker and Shane cite
a letter found in Bin Laden’s compound in which he cites this tactic as having
undermined support for the terror group.
Although the drone strikes and targeted killings may provide some
recruiting material for terrorist groups, the invasion and occupation of Iraq
and Afghanistan certainly served to radicalize more of the Muslim population
and draw more into the terrorist ranks.
Finally,
there is a lack of better of options to fight the War on Terror and provide
national security on that front. Local
regimes have proven incapable of control terrorist or radical elements within
their territory or have even been implicated in supporting these groups. Yemen and Somalia are failed states that cannot
control much of their own territory, Pakistan is on the verge on being a failed
state with little control over the tribal regions where much of the terror
groups hide and elements of the military and ISI are directly tied to these
groups. Invasion, occupation, and nation
building in the region have proved too costly in terms of both lives lost and
monetary cost, shown little long term improvement, and served to radicalize
elements of the population. Holding
prisoners indefinitely in places such as Guantanamo bay served as a recruiting
tool to terrorists and the jails in Middle Eastern countries have proven
ineffective in holding the prisoners (Al Qaeda jail breaks in Yemen or
prisoners being able to carry on their role in the terror group from behind
bars). Becker and Shane also mention the
political difficulties in holding terrorists in the U.S. and the legal
difficulties in trying them in civilian or military courts (how evidence was
obtained).
The
targeted killing program, through the use of armed drones, precision air
strikes, and small ground strikes, has been an effective tool for enhancing
national security and remains the best option on the table for keeping the
nation secure from terrorist threats.
Cost of Afghan and Iraq Wars: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/study-iraq-afghan-war-costs-to-top-4-trillion/2013/03/28/b82a5dce-97ed-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_story.html
New America Foundation drone strike database: http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis
Al Qaeda Jail Break, Yemen 2011 : http://www.cbsnews.com/news/al-qaeda-militants-escape-yemen-prison/
How would you respond to a critic who claims that drone strikes increase the anti-US sentiment around the world? The optical harms resultant from our drone program are certainly difficult to quantify, but it is hard to deny that they do in fact exist. How do we know that the use of drones is not actually prolonging the "War on Terror?"
ReplyDeleteI think that there is no denying that drone strikes do increase anti-U.S. sentiment but compared to the other option of troops on the ground or intervention and nation building, I think it is the best option with the least radicalizing effects. I don't believe that there is a diplomatic solution to our conflict with these groups. It can not be solved through understanding, humanitarian aid, or civil society groups. The U.S. and the west cannot build a wall behind which to hide and therefore defeating the enemy will involve doing out there and killing as many of them as possible. I see the options for this as either the ground interventions such as Iraq and Afghanistan or the targeted killing program.
DeleteI would argue that it does not prolong the War on Terror because if we stopped the drone strikes and targeted killings, it would not change the goals or motivations of the enemy. Terror groups would find other alleged "offenses" of the West on which to recruit new members and fuel their propaganda.It is important to remember that the goal of some of these groups is the destruction of the west and the establishment of a global caliphate. No amount of aid, diplomacy, or deescalation of force by the West will satisfy the enemy with these goals.