National Security Advocacy as a “Moral Judgment”?

            Arnold Wolfers argues that policymakers who “advocate a policy devoted to national security are not always aware of the fact – if they do not explicitly deny it – that they are passing moral judgment when they advise a nation to pursue the goal of national security” because they “[imply], knowingly or not, that more security is sufficiently desirable to warrant such evils as the cut in much-needed social welfare benefits or as the extension of the period of military service” (499). This claim, however, rests on the assumption of a utilitarian moral framework. Alternative construals of morality might cause us to question whether or not policymakers do in fact pass “moral judgment” when they devote money to the national security apparatus at the expense of social welfare programs. If an action is moral or immoral does not necessarily depend on how well it maximizes the sum of people’s happiness, but may instead be concerned with constraints on permitted actions.

            First, it should be demonstrated that Wolfers does indeed approach the subject of moral judgment from a utilitarian perspective. He writes the following: “If someone insists that his country should do more to build up its strength, he is…comparing and weighing values in order to decide which of them are deemed sufficiently good to justify the evil of sacrificing others” (499). Morality becomes an issue once the normative signifier should is used, and the discussion here seems to concern utilitarianism prima facie – i.e., the idea that one ought to maximize benefits for society while minimizing harms. “Compare” and “weigh” are the two key words here because under utilitarianism, actions which seem morally questionable can be justified by virtue of the gains realized by society as a whole.

Whenever people discuss the morality of actions in the context of achieving certain goals, it is a clear sign of utilitarianism at work. After public opinion polls have been collected, different options considered, and computer simulations run, lawmakers can gain a lot of insight regarding policies needed in order to elicit a particular outcome – political, economic, or otherwise. Of course, many of these policies might seem distasteful or even downright immoral. In these situations, the natural response is oftentimes to alter expectations about what kind of goals are achievable. If a nation wants complete security, Wolfers argues it will need to take over the entire world to eliminate external threats, in all likelihood constituting an extreme moral violation. Most nations clearly do not attempt to eliminate so thoroughly all threats to their well-being, and Wolfers states that a policymaker’s “most difficult moral task” is his decision regarding “which level of security to make his target” (500).

            An emphasis on outcomes is not the only lens through which the nature of morality can be viewed, however. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick observes that morality can be analyzed in terms of “side constraints upon the actions to be done: don’t violate constraints C…[Actors] may place the nonviolation of rights as a constraint upon action, rather than…building it into the end state to be realized” (30). Given this, Wolfers’ use of the term “moral judgment” seems a bit strong. To use this phrase implies the condemnation of a particular act because it is immoral. Even if some people believe that welfare spending must be cut to reach a level of security deemed optimal for society, they might not believe these reductions take on a decidedly moral quality as long as no side constraints are violated. Certain actions are undoubtedly worthy of our express moral censure. But while making a fiscal sacrifice might be stingy, painful, or otherwise unfortunate, it does not always take on a dimension that can be judged in this way.  

            To phrase things differently, Wolfers talks about morality in terms of the positive actions that policymakers should make, subject to a complicated weighing of potential outcomes. On the other hand, a side constraint view frames the question in terms of what policymakers shouldn’t do, regardless of the consequences. The side constraint view might admittedly break down in extreme cases, and Nozick himself punts the issue: “The question of whether these side constraints are absolute or whether they may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral horror…is one I hope largely to avoid” (30).

Discussing the relative merits of the utilitarian versus the side constraint view is far outside the scope of this brief essay. Nonetheless, there is a clear precedent within political theory for thinking about morality differently than Wolfers does, and one can see the potential implications for policymakers. Instead of weighing the costs and benefits of particular “evil” actions, they might ask whether or not said actions may be carried out at all. This question should be considered by those concerned with the ethical implications of new legislation.