The threat from communism and the USSR is
presented is terms of good versus evil with the United States representing and
fighting for all that is right and good in the world against the evil USSR
seeking to dominate and control the world.
The security situation is presented in the most dire of terms with the “potential
destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself destruction
not only of this Republic but of civilization itself” being the outcome
if the U.S. was to lose in its confrontation against the evils of
communism.
Today,
sixty five years later, the report can come across as overly dramatic or apocalyptical but the rapidly changing world power structure,
new weapons of mass destruction and the rise of an expansionist and
confrontational ideology (communism) all provide important context for the
sense of urgency and concern in the NSC report.
The end of World War II saw the decline of the Western European states
as world powers and the rise of the U.S. and USSR as the world’s two super
powers. The end of World War II also saw
the introduction and devastating effect of atomic weapons by the U.S. and the
USSR gained atomic weapons capability shortly after. The world was now faced with two states that could
kill large amounts of opposing citizens and wipe out cities with a single
bomb. The arms race that the U.S. and
USSR found themselves in from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold
War can be connected to Wolfers’ point that the “power of resistance cannot be
unmistakably distinguished from the power of resistance” (494). Increased defense spending or upgraded armaments
by the U.S. to counter a previous advance by the USSR could be mistake as an aggressive
position by the USSR and they then choose to respond with measures of their own.
Aside
from fighting fascism in WWII, the U.S. had never confronted an ideology such
as communism, an ideology that was the complete opposite of its own and did not
see a world where the two ideologies could coexist. Facing an enemy with ideology that is foreign
and hostile to one’s own ideology allows for the creation of a greater threat
in the nations psychology. Because most
citizens haven’t been face to face with the ideology and it is displayed as so
hostile to their own, they are unable to put a face to it and instead see it as
some lurking, menacing evil.
Comparing
the fundamental purpose of the U.S. and the fundamental design of the Kremlin
as described in the report illustrates how at odds the NSC felt the two
countries were and how threatened the U.S. felt by the USSR. The fundamental purpose of the U.S. is
summarized as “to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society”. The NSC frames the fundamental design of the
Kremlin as expansionist, authoritarian, threatening, and that the U.S. “is the
principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by
one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design”. Here again is a framing of the conflict as
good versus evil, freedom versus tyranny, and the destruction of the U.S. as a
potential outcome.
The
report goes on to describe the objectives in confronting the USSR and how the
U.S. intends to do so. The objectives
are to build up U.S. economic and military strength, support friendly nations, and
to “foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system”,
essentially overthrow or end communist rule in the USSR. Important to note here is that the U.S.
frames this conflict as the result of Soviet aggression but the U.S. does seek
to overthrow the Soviet regime. Further while portraying communism as hostile
to liberal, capitalist values of the U.S., the report states “we can expect no
lasting abatement of the crisis unless and until a change occurs in the nature
of the Soviet system”. So the
U.S. sees no way that it can coexist with communism, there is a mutual
hostility from each ideology. The NSC
seeks to promote dissent within the USSR to bring about a change but also wants
to build up military defenses to deter an attack on the U.S. or the “free world”.
Finally
it is important to note that despite the severe threat outlined in the report,
the NSC rejects an attack on the USSR or any kind of preemptive strike. This was seen as unlikely to be successful and
likely to unite the Russian people around the regime.
We might be interested to think about how our conceptions of national security have changed from the Cold War to the "War on Terror." It's my impression that back in the Cold War days, we were most concerned about the nuclear threat to our national security. Our opponents had a distinct face and ideology and were thus easily identifiable. Today, terrorist threats are shadowy -- targeting one particular state or ideology is no longer sufficient in order to reach an optimum level of security.
ReplyDeleteObviously, our strategies employed to promote national security must change dramatically in order to counter the new threat. An interesting question to ask: have any outdated Cold War-era strategies carried over to the "War on Terror," perhaps caused by institutional entrenchment?
I agree with you, Nathan. Just to add to that, I also wanted to point out the prevalence of cyber security in modern day culture that clearly was not a factor during the cold war. Just another example of evolution of security.
DeleteI'm not sure if any Cold War strategies carried over to the War on Terror and I think part of the confusion and trouble in the War on Terror has been that the plans and war games that the military had carried out during the 50 years of the Cold War don't apply to the War on Terror. The military had planned for a large scale conventional war that would likely take place in Europe. A battle that would involve opposing air forces, divisions of troops, large tank formations, and enemy infrastructure to target. The enemy in the War on terror lacks this and I think early on this caused some confusion and paralysis in the defense sector but has gradually resulted in a changing focus in the military (more small, elite mobile units, drones, CIA paramilitary operations). I think that policy makers and the public still search for a conventional enemy to fight and "defeat" in the War on Terror and that may be something carried over.
ReplyDeleteI think that the threat of war or an attack was less in the Cold War but the destruction that would result would be unimaginable. In the War on Terror the likelihood of conflict or attack is greater but the damage that it can cause is much less. Another important difference is that despite our ideological differences with communism, they were largely rational actors. They wanted to survive, it was possible to negotiate with them, and over time build economic ties and trade. With the enemy in the War on Terror there is limited room to negotiate and I would argue that they are irrational actors (some may are that they are rational based on their own goals).
ISIS is potentially developing into an enemy with larger forces and infrastructure to target (captured military bases, oil facilities) but once we destroy those or kill much of their fighters, they will probably devolve back into the more mobile, less organized force that they were. Further defeating ISIS will not end radical Islamic terrorism in the region, like defeating the Russians would end the USSR and Soviet threat.
ReplyDeleteI agree on this point -- there is no military force today (maybe China can soon?) which will seriously endanger the forces of the United States. Guerrilla tactics are the way to go when you're the weaker side of an asymmetric war.
DeleteRelated to guerrilla tactics being the way of the weaker, Max Boot's relatively recent Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare argues exactly that. Boot argues that guerrilla tactics are adopted by those too weak to field conventional forces but guerrilla forces are continually striving to someday develop into a conventional force capable of facing and defeating their enemy in a conventional battle.
DeleteAlso I think it is important to mention that despite the focus on fighting terrorism, Buzan does state that the majority of U.S. defense plans still focus around being prepared to fight a conventional enemy(1102).
Some Cold War strategies have remained the same when dealing with an ideological security threat. The United States government frequently uses the defense of freedom and the defense of the state interchangeably. The strategy in the Cold War to combat the ideology of communism was to be the model and the gold standard of happiness. This would in turn change the minds of the Soviet Citizens and they would wish to evoke change from within. The same overall method remains the same when dealing with the terrorists and failing states. The difference now is that we have the capability to enter into armed conflict to directly instigate the changes, which was not possible with a nuclear armed opponent.
ReplyDeleteI agree that the "defense of freedom" rallying cry has been invoked in both conflicts. Similarly there has been a crackdown or restriction on speech/press and privacy freedoms in both conflicts. I think that there are similarities between the red scare of the 1950s and the recent revelations about NSA monitoring and data collection.
DeleteInteresting Parallel here. I am usually skeptical of claims that everything is the same or that everything has changed so it is good to suss out what might have changed and what might not have.
DeleteIt will be interesting to see if you still think that the Red Scare (or the FBI surveillance of some Americans, usually black or leftist) is similar to NSA surveillance today and why it may or may not be similar (technology, goals, targets, etc.). I have come across those who say that it is the same thing and those who think it is something totally different.